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In the last few years there has been an explosion in the number of papers that aim to explain what
determines country risk (defined as the difference between the yield of a sovereign’s bonds and the
risk free rate). In this paper, we contribute to the discussion using by showing that Brazilian states
with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand (e.g.,
rubber and coffee) between 1891 and 1930 ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus, lower
cost of capital. The link between exports and state government revenues works in the Brazilian case
because of the extreme form of fiscal federalism that the Brazilian government adopted in the Constitution
of 1891, giving state governments the sole right to tax exports. We create a panel of state debt risk
premia and a series of state level fiscal variables and we show, using OLS, that having specific commodities
gave states access capital in better terms (i.e., lower risk premium) in international markets. We also
confirm our results that states with better commodities had lower risk premia when we use export
price indices for each of the states as instruments for state revenue per capita. ¸
André C. Martínez Fritscher
Banco de Mexico















In the last few years there has been an explosion in the number of papers that aim to explain 
what determines country risk. Using the difference between the yield of a sovereign’s bonds 
and the risk free rate (usually defined as the yield of British bonds), these papers have tried to 
explain what macroeconomic or political variables explain more of the variation in country risk 
or “risk premium” across emerging markets. In this paper, we contribute to the discussion 
exploring the following question: do endowments matter to determine the cost of capital for a 
country or state? We study the determinants of the risk premium of the bonds issued by 
Brazilian states between 1891 and 1930, a period of extreme decentralization of fiscal revenues 
and expenditures in Brazil.  We find that risk premia are highly correlated with state public 
revenue per capita. Because these revenues came, to a large extent, from the taxes states levied 
on commodity exports, we argue that endowments mattered to determine the cost of capital for 
states. We define endowments as the set of natural resources (such as soil types), climatic 
conditions, and geographic variables (e.g., altitude) that constrain the kind of crops a farmer 
within a given state can produce.  In fact, the relationship between state public revenue per 
capita and risk premiums is also strong when we instrument for state public revenue per capita 
using a series of price indices of commodity exports by state. 
In the literature of sovereign risk there is no consensus as to what matters to determine 
the cost of capital for governments.  For instance, according to North and Weingast, 
constitutional changes that limit the power of the ruler (e.g., by establishing clear checks and 
balances) should induce bondholders to reduce their perception of sovereign risk given that 
with more veto players, there is less probability of default or expropriation of debtholders.1 
Bordo and Rockoff show that adherence to the gold standard worked as a “good housekeeping 
seal of approval,” reducing the cost of capital for sovereigns because it induced governments to 
follow prudent fiscal and monetary policy.2  Ferguson and Shularick find that beyond fiscal 
                                                      
1 D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, `Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions       
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England´, Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), pp. 
803-832. 
2  M .  B o r d o  H .  R o c k o f f ,  ` T h e  G o l d  S t a n d a r d  a s  a  ' G o o d  H o u s e k e e p i n g  s e a l  o f  A p p r o v a l ' ´  Journal of   
Economic History, 56 (1996), pp. 389-428. 3 
 
variables what mattered to reduce yields was whether the borrowing country was part of the 
British Empire.3  Sussman and Yafeh and Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh find that the perception 
of country risk of foreign investors in the emerging markets of the late nineteenth century 
changed significantly mostly when countries adopted the gold standard or when they were 
victorious in a major war.4  Also, Landon-Lane and Oosterlinck find that investors of Russian 
bonds adjusted their perception of risk significantly when news about World War I changed 
their expectations of repayment.5  
Flandreau and Zumer give more importance to fiscal factors than to political institutions 
or the adoption of the gold standard. For them, the main factor determining the cost of capital 
for sovereigns between 1880 and 1913 was their fiscal capacity to pay (e.g., interest or debt 
service over government revenues).6 
For the case of Brazil, Abreu and Summerhill have paid close attention to the issue of 
capacity to pay and the spread of Brazilian sovereign bonds relative to UK bonds.  Summerhill 
examines the capacity to pay of the central government between 1822 and 1889. He argues that 
during this period the central government of Brazil was able to generate a credible commitment 
to repay its debts because the political system (a constitutional monarchy) had many veto 
players preventing any attempt of default.7 Abreu suggests that the central government of 
Brazil was not that great of a debtor after 1898 and estimates the actual rates of return for 
holders of Brazilian debt in foreign currency. He suggests that, in fact, some states had lower 
spreads (lower default risk) than the central government because they exported precious 
                                                      
3 Ferguson, Niall and Moritz Schularick,  `The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the 
First Age of Globalization, 1880–1913´, Journal of Economic History, 66 (2006), pp. 283–312. 
4 N. Sussman and Y. Yafeh, `Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government 
Debt in the Meiji Era´, Journal of Economic History, 60 (2000), pp. 442–467; and P. Mauro, N. Sussman and 
Y. Yafeh. Emerging Markets and Financial Globalization: Sovereign Bond Spreads in 1870–1913 and Today  
(Oxford and New York, 2006). 
5 J. Landon-Lane and K. Oosterlinck, `Hope springs eternal: French bondholders and the Soviet 
Repudiation (1915-1919)´, Review of Finance, 10 (2006), pp. 507-535 
 
6 M. Flandreau and F. Zumer, The Making of Global Finance: 1880-1913 (Paris, 2004). 
7 W. Summerhill III. ‘Credible Commitment in the Tropics: Sovereign Borrowing in Imperial Brazil, 1822–
1889´, presented at the conference New Frontiers in Latin American Economic History, Harvard 
University, May 16-17, 2008. 4 
 
commodities like coffee. Moreover, he highlights the fact that rubber-exporting states like Pará 
defaulted in the 1920s after the price of rubber plummeted.8  
We extend those studies by looking at the debt that Brazilian states issued in 
international markets in more detail.  We use fiscal capacity to pay as the main explanatory 
variable of the default risk or the risk premium of the bonds issued by states (we define fiscal 
capacity to pay as state revenue per capita).  We show that thanks to the Constitution of 1891 
states were able to tax the export of commodities and increased their ability to service their 
debts. Since some states had commodities that had higher prices than others, we explain the 
variation in the cost of capital, among other things, using the variation in the individual states’ 
capacity to collect export tax revenues. We do not assign too much weight to the states’ 
willingness to pay because domestic elites did not have to face the burden of heavy tax 
collection. In general, most states obtained the majority of their funding from export taxes and 
the incidence of those taxes fell on consumers (e.g., taxes on coffee and rubber exports). 
Our explanation of how endowments matter is pretty straightforward. Given our 
definition of endowments as the conditions that determine what kind of commodities can be 
produced and exported in a determined geographical region, we divide our argument into two 
parts. The first part is about how endowments constrained and partly determined the kind of 
commodities Brazilian states produced and the amounts of those commodities states exported. 
The second part of the argument is about how the differences in commodity exports at the state 
level generated marked differences in the cost of capital for state governments.  
First, farmers in Brazilian states tried to maximize their income through a mix of crops 
according to two constraints: the prices of commodities in international markets and the 
limitations to choose their “portfolio” of commodities according to the natural endowments of 
the state.  That is, even if coffee was the most valuable commodity a Brazilian farmer could 
produce and export, only farmers in high hills with temperate weather and specific soil types 
could actually produce coffee.  Thus, rather than taking endowments as given and as having 
effects only after the interaction with colonial institutions, as has been the case in the literature 
                                                      
8 M. Abreu, `Brazil as a debtor, 1824-1931´, Economic History Review, 59 (2006), pp. 765-787 
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on endowments and institutions (e.g., as in Engerman and Sokoloff; Bruhn and Gallego; 
Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção), 9 we view the importance of endowments as changing over 
time according to the demand for international commodities (mostly determined in 
international markets). For instance, Brazilian states with the capacity to produce sugar may 
have had valuable endowments in the 17th and 18th centuries, but by the nineteenth century new 
sugar producers abroad drove the price down and created a long decline in the economic 
supremacy of sugar states in Brazil.  In the second half of the nineteenth century commodities 
such as coffee, rubber, mate, and cotton had unexpected booms that provided advantages for 
rapid growth to some states over others.  
The second part of our argument is that states did not take advantage of the boom in 
commodity exports until after the Constitution of 1891 gave states the autonomy to pursue their 
own policies and tax their own exports. In fact, this constitution established a federalist system 
with extreme fiscal decentralization.10 Between 1891 and 1930, states were in charge of collecting 
most taxes, including taxes on exports, while the federal government taxed imports and paid 
for national public goods like defense. Since there was very limited redistribution among states 
or from the central government to other states, the capacity of states to issues debt and to pay 
for it depended heavily on export taxes each state collected. 
Therefore, our objective is to show that revenues per capita determined to a large extent 
the perceptions that investors had of the default risk implicit in the bonds that states sold in 
international markets and that these revenues were determined by the kind of commodity states 
could export. We construct a panel of state level data with annual observations of commodity 
exports, population, debt per capita, and fiscal revenues per capita, as well as estimates of the 
risk premium (difference in the yield of each state’s bonds relative to the yield of British 
                                                      
9 S. Engerman and K. Sokoloff , ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth´ in S. 
Haber (ed.), Why Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford, 1997);  M. Bruhn and F. Gallego, ‘Good, Bad, and 
Ugly Colonial Activities: Studying Development Across the Americas´, MIT mimeo (2007);  and J. 
Naritomi, R.R. Soares and J.J. Assunção, ‘Rent Seeking and the Unveiling Of 'De Facto' Institutions: 
Development and Colonial Heritage Within Brazil´, NBER Working paper  no. 13545 (2007). 
10 See André C. Martinez Fritscher. ‘Bargaining for Fiscal Control: Tax Federalism in Brazil and Mexico, 
1870-1940,´ Boston University,  Ph. D. dissertation  (2009) 6 
 
consols). We estimate the determinants of risk premium (a proxy for “country risk”) using 
different panel estimation approaches, including a set of instrumental variables estimates.  
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature in another way.  We think there could be 
both serial correlation and a potential endogeneity problem in our ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. The potential endogeneity problem could come because before 1930, and in particular 
before 1914, the capacity to collect revenues depended to a large extent on the capacity that 
countries had to export and that capacity was, in turn, dependent on the infrastructure of each 
nation. Since most of the infrastructure was financed through debt issues, we think the cost of 
capital in a way determined the level of revenues per capita. This problem is obviously hard to 
solve, but by considering the fact that fiscal capacity was to a large extent determined by the 
kind of commodities states could export, we device an instrumental variables approach that 
treats the export mix of states as exogenous and uses the changes in prices as a way to explain 
fiscal revenues per capita at the state level. The instrumental variables approach reinforces our 
findings that commodity exports determined capacity to pay and investor’s perceptions of 
country risk, and support our general conclusion that endowments mattered to determine the 
risk premium of the states’ debt before 1930. Furthermore, the regressions with instrumental 
variables help us control for possible serial correlation.  
The paper is divided into four additional sections. Section II provides a brief explanation 
of the Constitution of 1891 and the configuration of the fiscal system in Brazil. Section III, 
presents the methodology. Section IV presents the findings and Section V concludes. 
Fiscal Federalism in Brazil, 1821–1930 
In this section we explain why we look at the period 1891-1930 and explain why the yields 
of Brazilian state bonds during this period can be treated as independent observations. We 
highlight two major factors. First, that Brazil did not have a decentralized fiscal system until 
after 1889, and more formally after the Constitution of 1891. Second, we show that between 1891 
and 1930 there were marked differences in the level of revenues per capita, debt per capita, and 
the cost of capital among Brazilian states. In the next section we explain how we will exploit 
those differences to run our estimates of the determinants of the cost of capital for states in 
Brazil.  7 
 
The fiscal system of Brazil before 1889 was very centralized and depended heavily on trade 
taxes. After independence in 1821 Brazil had a constitutional monarchy, with a two-tiered 
parliament, and a council of ministers running the central government. The constitution of 1824 
gave the central government the right to tax imports and exports.  As a consequence, the 
imperial government collected around 80-85% of the total public revenue in Brazil, with 50% of 
the total revenue coming from tariffs on imports.11 For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Public Works (in charge of around one quarter of the federal budget in 1888), responsible for 
“improvements” such as railroads, ports, colonization, and so forth,12 in 1888 spent 66% of its 
total budget in the Rio de Janeiro area and only 3.14% in the state of Sao Paulo.13 The northeast 
and northern regions also contributed more than they received. The south was a net beneficiary, 
receiving large amounts of money to finance military bases on the borders with Argentina and 
Uruguay.  
The power of provincial governments was weak until 1889 as these governments had little 
control over fiscal revenues.  The provinces were not allowed to collect import taxes or inter-
provincial trade taxes, but implicitly they had the right to collect export taxes and in practice 
they also collected interstate taxes.  
In 1889, a republican movement overthrew the emperor in a peaceful revolution and 
established a provisional government in charge of drafting a new constitution. The provisional 
government created a commission of legal specialists to write the first draft of a new 
constitution. This first draft was then sent to the Constitutional Congress for a final revision and 
approval.14 One of the most important issues discussed at all levels was the distribution of tax 
revenues among the federation and the states. The debate did not revolve around the issue of 
whether Brazil should be a federalist republic, but how decentralized the federalist system was 
going to be.  
                                                      
11 Brazil, Ministerio da Agricultura, Finanças da União e dos Estados 1822-1913 (Rio de Janeiro, 1917). 
12 A. Villela.’ Distribuição Regional das Receitas e Despesas do Governo Central no II Reinado, 1844-
1889´,  Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, 37 (2007), p. 247-274. 
13 Martinez Fritscher. ‘Bargaining for Fiscal Control: Tax Federalism in Brazil and Mexico, 1870-1940´. 
14 W .  P .  C o s t a ,  ‘ A  Q u e s t ã o  F i s c a l  n a  T r a n s f o r m a ç ã o Republicana: Continuidades e Descontinuidades´, 
Economia e Sociedade, 10 (1998), pp. 141-174. 8 
 
After intense negotiations the Constitutional Assembly passed a new Constitution on 
February 24, 1891, which gave states the right to tax exports, to have their own armed forces, 
and to organize gubernatorial elections.15 By not including any limitations to the amount of debt 
states could issue, the Constitution implicitly gave states the right to issue debt domestically 
and abroad.16 Below we explain the implications that these legal changes had for the capacity 
that different states had to collect taxes and issue debt. 
The Decentralization of State Tax Revenues 
After the 1891 Constitution, states relied on export taxes as an important source of revenue. 
State public revenues from export taxes represented on average around 60% of total revenue 
between 1914 and 1916. States such as Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Norte collected more 
than 85% of their revenues from export taxes. São Paulo increased its collection capacity per 
capita three times after 1891, collecting almost 40% of what all the states collected with only half 
of the total exports and less than one fifth of the population. In contrast, Góias and Rio Grande 
do Sul collected only 24% and 29% of their revenues from export taxes.  
The decentralization of trade taxes generated a marked inequality in the capacity that states 
had to collect taxes. In Table 1 we can see the significant variation in state revenue per capita 
among the different Brazilian states. The average revenue per capita was 9.5 mil reis (about $3 
dollars), but some states collected over 20 mil reis per capita and a large number of states 
collected less than 4.5 mil reis per capital. We can also see that the states that benefited the most 
from decentralization were those states with the largest exports per capita.  These are states 
                                                      
15 Costa, ‘A Questão Fiscal na Transformação Republicana: Continuidades e Descontinuidades´. 
16 Love points out that even some of the states that wanted more fiscal autonomy supported a relatively 
strong central government (with the right to collect all import duties) because they understood the 
benefits of having a national authority in charge of monetary policy, negotiating trade treaties with other 
countries, and backing states on certain programs with positive spillovers across states (e.g., the coffee 
valorization program). See J.L. Love, ‘Federalismo y Regionalismo en Brasil, 1889-1937´, in M.   
Carmagnani, (coord.), Federalismos Latinoamericanos: Mexico/Brasil/Argentina (México, 1993). 
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such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro state, Paraná, Espírito Santo, which exported coffee, and 
Amazonas and Pará, which exported rubber.17 
Once the state governments got the right to tax exports they did not raise the level of export 
duties, they left them unchanged and instead focused on reshuffling the revenue sharing 
schemes they had with the central government. For instance, in São Paulo and Minas Gerais the 
state governments charged a tax rate for coffee exports of 11%. Before the Constitution of 1891 
the central government collected 7% out of the 11% and left 4% for state governments. After the 
Constitution the entire 11% was kept at the state level. 18 
Most of the export taxes were ad valorem (see Table 2). Therefore, what really mattered for 
the capacity to pay of state governments was that the total value of exports would go up. Table 
2 shows the significant variation in tax rates for commodity exports (by type of commodity), 
which most likely reflect the differences in the elasticity of demand for each of the commodities. 
Rubber, with a highly inelastic demand, had the highest export tax level. Fernandes estimates, 
in a static exercise, that rubber states charged taxes that were below the optimal to maximize 
welfare at the state level (assuming rubber-exporting states could have behaved like a 
monopoly).19 20 Yet the variation in tax rates for the same commodity among different states is 
not that large and mostly seems to compensate for the differences in the cost of transportation. 
In states in which it has more expensive to export rubber, because of transportation costs or 
relative scarcity of rubber trees, taxes were relatively lower than in the states with abundant 
resources and closer to the ocean. Amazonas (AM) or Pará (PA), where the tax rates on rubber 
                                                      
17 Paraná had coffee as its main export in the 1920s, it was mainly a mate tea exporter in the first two 
decades of our study. 
18 See J.L. Love, São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937 (Stanford, 1980); and S. Topik, The Political 
Economy of the Brazilian State, 1889-1930 (Austin, 1987). 
19 It is not clear that in a dynamic game states would have wanted to charge higher taxes. Brazil was 
losing its comparative advantage to new producers in Southeast Asia and higher tax rates could have 
sped up the process. In fact, one could speculate whether Brazil would have lost its competitive edge in 
natural rubber so fast (around 1910).  
20 F.T. Fernandes, ‘Taxation and Welfare: The Case of Rubber in the Brazilian Amazon (1870-1910)´ 
mimeo presented at the 69th meeting of the Economic History Association Meeting(2009). 10 
 
exports were 20% and 22%,21 there was a slight difference in taxes to compensate for distance to 
the ocean.  
There is also some evidence of variation in tax rates over time. For instance, some states 
moved tax rates in a countercyclical way. The governments of Minas Gerais and São Paulo 
lowered the tax rates on coffee exports from 11% to 9% to increase the volume of sales when 
international coffee prices declined.  
In sum, the fiscal system of Brazil was decentralized after the Constitution of 1891 
provided states with the capacity to tax exports and we will show that those differences in tax 
revenues were translated in differences in the cost of capital for state governments.  
Yet, the state’s capacity to pay was to a large extent determined by the state’s 
commodity exports. In turn, the capacity to export specific commodities was constrained by the 
natural resources of each of the states. We argue that planters, farmers, and cattle ranchers in 
each state could choose what to produce and export, but were constrained by the natural 
endowments of the places where they produced commodities. For instance, coffee could only be 
produced in places with high altitude, temperate weather, and with specific types of yellow soil 
(latossolos amarelos). Therefore, natural endowments determined what could be produced and 
economic agents maximized their income according to their limitations of land, weather, and 
altitude.  
In Table 3 we show that crop specialization (using the share of each commodity to total 
exports) was highly correlated with soil types and geographic and climatic variables (Panel A).  
For instance, states that had rubber as a large share of their exports also had high rainfall, high 
temperatures, low altitude, and were close to the equator. In fact, natural rubber could not be 
grown in plantations, so the constraints were even stricter, i.e., rubber exporters could tap 
rubber only in the places where it grew naturally. For coffee the most important factor was high 
altitude, low sun light, and lower temperatures (see Panel B of Table 3). That is, there were 
many of these geographic, exogenous variables determining how much a state could export 
                                                      
21 J. Lyra, Economia e Finanças dos Estados do Brasil, 1913 (Parahyba 1914).  
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and, in fact, the geographic variables are significantly correlated with public revenue per capita 
at the state level (see Panel C of Table 3).  
The Variation in the Cost of Capital for Brazilian States 
The variation across states in terms of the cost of capital and the amounts of debt issued 
followed a clear pattern: states with larger exports per capita were able to sell more debt in 
international markets and paid lower interest rates for those loans.  Table 1 shows data on the 
distribution of debt (or bond issues) by state. The table depicts clearly the concentration of debt 
issues in four states: São Paulo, Minas Gerais, the Federal District (in Rio de Janeiro), and Bahia. 
All of these states, except Bahia, had coffee as their largest export. In fact, these were the states 
with the largest populations in the Brazilian federation, so we would expect them to have a 
higher demand for external financing to pay for infrastructure and other improvements. In fact, 
in our multivariate analysis we control for population and also scale state revenues by 
population. The second thing to note in Table 1 is that the column with data for the average 
year of bond issues per state shows that most debt issues happened between 1909 and 1917, 
perhaps because this was the peak period for international capital flows to Latin America.22 
Figure 2 shows that Brazilian states managed to place bonds in at least four of the largest 
financial markets of the time. Almost half of the bond issues were denominated in pounds 
sterling and traded in the London Stock Exchange. States issued another 24% of the total debt in 
French francs and traded the bonds in Paris and Brussels. Finally, in the 1920s, many of the new 
state bond issues were denominated in US dollars and were traded in the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
As a product of the international supply of funds and the conditions that allowed 
Brazilian states to borrow we find significant variation in the cost of capital for states. Table 4 
shows the variation in the cost of capital for states between 1890 and 1931 (the cost of capital is 
estimated as the bond’s coupon rate over the average price of the bond minus the yield of 
                                                      
22 See I. Stone. The Global Export of Capital From Great Britain, 1865-1914: A Statistical Survey (New York, 




British bonds). It is important to note that there is significant variation over time and across 
states. Much of the variation in cost of capital across states, we argue, can be captured by the 
variation in the crop specialization (see Panel C of Table 3). The variation over time, which is 
high, is a product of the variation in the price of the main commodities exported by each of the 
states. Thus, the logic is that states specialized in certain commodities, the prices of those 
commodities fluctuated over time and the combination of both determined the capacity to pay 
of the states. The willingness to pay of states, that is the ad valorem tax levels, increased when 
prices were higher (in commodities like rubber or coffee that high relatively inelastic demands) 
and decreased during bad times. For other commodities we do not have much evidence of 
change over time. 
We study the cost of capital for state debt issued abroad for two reasons. First investor 
perceptions of capacity to pay were based on their informed estimates of the fiscal capacity of 
states, the information they had about states’ exports, and, indirectly, on the kinds of natural 
endowments the states had. The prospectuses of state bonds contained information on what the 
funds were going to be used for and explained what sources of revenues backed each of the 
issues. Second, states issued the bulk of their debt abroad, about 66% of their total debt (see 
Table 5). Third, the cost of capital (the spread over the risk-free rate, i.e., the UK consols rate) 
abroad reflected the cost of capital that state governments in Brazil faced to pay for large public 
infrastructure projects. This is because the largest share of the capital obtained through foreign 
bond issues was used to pay for infrastructure (18%) and other urban improvements, such as 
waterworks, sewage, and other projects (39%). Also, a large part of all bond issues abroad were 
used to roll over past debts (39%) (see Figure 1). 
Now, one may think that because we are excluding domestic bond issues we are not 
taking into account the bond issues of all the states or we are biasing our estimates to look only 
at the bonds issues by states that had significant exports of commodities. Table 5 shows that the 
domestic bond market was also dominated by the same states that issued most of the bonds in 
international markets. Therefore, the data for domestic issues and our database of foreign bond 
issues have similar biases. Moreover, we collected all of the state bond quotations available in 
the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange and tried adding them to the database. The problem that we 
get is that most of the data of bond quotations that was regular was for bonds that were also 13 
 
traded abroad, so adding the quotations from the domestic stock market to our database yields 
a net addition of only 20 observations. This is because there are states like Sergipe and Góias 
that issued bonds that were only traded for one year. In the same way, Paraíba, Rio Grande do 
Norte, and Santa Catarina had regular trading of their bonds only during 10 years, in the 1920s, 
when there was more volatility in the market. 
We also have data for municipal bonds traded in Rio de Janeiro and London. Yet we 
believe this should not be included in the present analysis because investors estimated the price 
of these bonds in a completely different way. The main sources of revenue for municipalities 
were taxes on property or property transfers and a variety of stamp taxes. Moreover, it is not 
clear what relationship we should expect to find between state and municipal bonds. That is, 
they may not be comparable at all. In fact, in some cases municipal bond prices were more 
volatile than the state bond prices (e.g., in Belém vs. Pará and Manaus vs. Amazonas), but in 
others municipal bonds were more stable and apparently perceived as less risky than their state 
counterparts (e.g., Porto Alegre vs. Rio Grande do Sul). 
We believe that the investors who were trading Brazilian state bonds separated the risk 
implicit in each state from the risk implicit in the debt of other states, much like they separated 
the yields of different countries. We have found that in specialized publications, such as 
L’Êconomiste Europeen, there were sections detailing the state of public finances and the level of 
exports by state in Brazil, even disaggregated by product.  In fact, yields for different states are 
relatively independent from one another (see Table 4). There does not seem to be any contagion 
effect after one of the state defaults. For instance, Espirito Santo (ES) defaulted in 1900 and in 
that same year (and the following) the yield of bonds issued by the Federal District and São 
Paulo actually go down. In the 1920s many states in the north of Brazil defaulted on their debts 
and the yields implicit in their bonds skyrocketed without generating any negative effects on 
the yields of bonds of other states in the south of Brazil. The yields of states like Rio de Janeiro 
(RJ), São Paulo (SP), the Federal District (DF) or Minas Gerais (MG) do not seem to react to 
those events. 
In our view, investors were willing to lend at a lower cost when states had higher tax 
revenues per capita because they had a lower probability of default. Higher tax revenues per 
capita were usually a consequence of higher exports per capita at the state level. Table 6 shows 14 
 
that states that had higher revenue per capita also had lower spreads. This table shows the 
summary statistics of our complete dataset, separating the data into two categories, rich states 
(with revenues per capita above the median) and poor states (those below the median). 
According to the last columns there are significant differences in cost of capital and state 
revenues per capita among rich and poor states, especially in the size of the variation around 
the mean of the former. Richer states had a very tight distribution of spreads (cost of capital), 
with a mean of 0.04 (400 basis points) and a standard deviation of 0.04 (also 400 basis points), 
while poor states had a mean of 0.06 (600 basis points) and a standard deviation of 0.13 (1300 
basis points). In order to test if the relationship between revenues and cost of capital holds in 
the next section we explain the methodology we use to conduct multivariate analysis using 
panel data. 
Data and Methodology 
Our objective is to study the determinants of the cost of capital of Brazilian states 
between 1891 and 1930. In particular, we are interested in looking at the effects of state public 
revenues per capita on the cost of capital both over time and at the cross-section level. Thus we 
use panel data techniques controlling for a series of state characteristics, fixed effects, and time 
dummies.  
Compiling fiscal and debt data for the different states of the Brazilian federation 
between 1890 and 1930 required us to get statistics from a variety of archival sources and 
published materials. The Methodological Appendix describes in detail the sources used to 
estimate the key variables for the present analysis. Below is an explanation of how we construct 
our main dependent variables and how we design the empirical approach we use to examine 
the determinants of cost of capital for Brazilian states. 
Main Dependent Variable: Cost of Capital or Spreads (Yields)  
Since the yield of the bonds issued by Brazilian states is our main dependent variable it 
is worth explaining clearly how we estimate it. So far, we have constructed two measures for 
yields, one is the coupon yield, or the yield implicit in bond quotations according to the coupon 
payments of that bond. That is, the yield is just the coupon payment of a bond over the average 15 
 
price of that bond in a given year. For example, a 4% bond with face value of £100 quoted at £80 
would have a yield of 5% (because 4/80= 0.05). Since part of the return is to compensate for the 
opportunity cost of investors if they had invested in a risk-free asset, the yields we report 
subtract the average annual yield for UK consols. In that way the yields we study reflect the risk 
premium investors demanded to buy debt issued by Brazilian states. 
  This method of estimating the yields or spreads, however, assumes that bonds are 
perpetuities. According to Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh, “this approximation was reasonable, 
given that the bonds were usually of very long maturity [in our state bonds sample the average 
maturity is 33 years] , and probably seemed natural to the large proportion of investors who 
were  rentiers living off the fixed income provided by the bonds” (p.41).23 Moreover, these 
authors point out that the most sophisticated methods for calculating exact yield were 
developed until the second half of the twentieth century and that investors usually estimated 
their yields using prices and coupon rates. In fact, for Brazilian bonds it is hard to think that 
investors cared about yield to maturity since the federal government postponed repayments in 
1898 and 1914.24 That is, we believe investors had a short investment horizon.  
Our second measure of yield is an approximation of the yield to maturity of the debt 
issued by Brazilian states. Yield to maturity is a rate which reflects the flow of all the revenue 
(the gains—or losses—from bond appreciation—or depreciation—plus interests) derived from a 
given bond, relative to the price that investors pay for the bond today.  To estimate it we first 
subtract the current bond value (i.e., its current price) from its par value in order to obtain the 
discount that investors get when they buy the bond. Then, we assume that the profit (loss) from 
purchasing a bond today is only realized at maturity, when the bond is redeemed. We also 
assume that the profit (loss) of purchasing a bond today and having it redeemed at face value 
tomorrow is realized evenly over time. So if an investor buys a $100 bond at $80 today and the 
bond matures in 20 years, we assume the investor makes $20 of profit over 20 years and for 
simplicity we just assume the return from capital gains is $1 per year. We then add to this gain 
the profit an investor would make from the actual annual coupon payment of the bond, which 
                                                      
23 Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh, Emerging Markets and Financial Globalization: Sovereign Bond Spreads in 
1870–1913 and Today. 
24Abreu, `Brazil as a debtor, 1824-1931.´ 16 
 
is simply the coupon rate multiplied by the par value of the bond. This gives us the annual 
return for the investor, which we then divide by the current bond price to obtain the yield to 
maturity. 
 Given that we need the maturity to be able to estimate yield to maturity and we do not 
have this information for all the bonds, our sample of yields of state bonds using this approach 
is smaller than that for the yield calculated by using coupon rates only. Moreover using the 
sample of bond yields estimated using yield to maturity introduces another bias. Since many of 
the poorest states in Brazil could not issue bonds with long maturities (or at least we do not 
observe those), we end up estimating really high yield to maturity rates for those states when 
they were sold at a discount from par value. Therefore, our estimates with yield to maturity are 
biased in favor of our hypothesis that richer states faced lower cost of capital.  Since the first set 
of estimates using coupon yields do not bias the data in favor of our hypothesis, we make most 
of our inferences using those estimates and present some estimates using yield to maturity as a 
robustness check.  
Empirical Strategy 
The first step in our empirical approach is to address one of the biases in our data. In 
Table 1 we show that only 15 out of 20 Brazilian states issued foreign debt. More importantly, 
around half of the bonds issued in foreign markets, representing more than 70 % of the capital 
raised by states, were issued by 4 states. Thus, one may argue that there is a bias in the data 
because a few states issued most of the debt and some states did not even issue foreign debt. In 
Appendix A (Tables A1 and A2 we address this bias by running simple specifications of Cox 
Hazard or Probit models for which we create a dummy variable that is equal to one on the year 
when a state government issued a bond in international markets). That is, any state-year 
observation will take the value of 1 if the state issued a new foreign bond on that year and zero 
for all the other years. We find that, both in the Cox Hazard (Table A1) and the Probit (Table 
A2) estimates, having higher tax revenue per capita made states more likely to issue more debt 
in any given year. That is, the bias in our data goes in the same direction of our hypothesis. The 
states that did not issue bonds had low revenues per capita. 17 
 
Now, our main objective is to estimate the determinants of the spread or cost of capital 
for Brazilian states. Our hypothesis is that richer states were able to issue debt at a lower cost 
and in larger amounts in international capital markets.  We measure the states’ capacity to pay 
using state public revenue per capita. This is a good indicator of the economic characteristics of 
each state since it is correlated with total exports per capita by state and with a variety of 
geographical and geological variables at the state level. Moreover, most of the bonds issued 
during the period had diverse sources of state public revenue as guarantee, such as service fees 
(lighting, sewage, water, etc) and taxes (export taxes, professional, industry, etc). Therefore, 
state revenues per capita are a good measure of state capacity to pay international debts. 
Our basic specification to examine the determinants of the cost of capital by state is of 
the following form: 
 rit= β sit-1 + δXit + ζi+φt +εit, 
 where rit is the logarithm of the risk premium of state i at time t, measured as the difference 
between the state’s bond yield and the yield of British Consols. sit-1 is the logarithm of state 
public revenue for each state i lagged one period.  X is a vector of control variables that includes 
the logarithms of imports, population, and debt per state. We also use fixed effects for states (ζi) 
to control for state unobservable characteristics and time dummy variables (φt), accounting for 
time varying trends common for all states. When a state had more than one bond being traded 
in the secondary market we use the average of all the yields.  We repeat this exercise with our 
estimates of yield to maturity as well. 
States as independent units of analysis 
We are confident that we can treat states as independent observations for this analysis 
for two reasons. First, state bonds had no explicit or implicit bail out clauses. For instance, a few 
Brazilian states suspended payments (defaulted) on their debt over the period we study and 
those defaults were not followed by a bailout from other states or from the federal government. 
This was the case of Espírito Santo in 1900, Alagoas in 1921, Pará in 1922, Bahia in 1923, and 
Amazonas in 1924.  In Table 4 we can see the spread of those bonds (over the UK bonds) going 
up when the state governments default. Yet default in one state did not have negative effects on 
the spreads of other bonds, i.e., there was no contagion unless the default was the consequence 18 
 
of a trade shock that affected many states, as was the case with the low price of rubber in the 
early 1920s (affecting Pará and Amazonas). More importantly, there is no sovereign ceiling 
effect. Some of the states’ bonds were sometimes perceived as less risky than those of the federal 
government and in some years, such as 1914, the sovereign risk goes up faster than the risk for 
other bonds. Take for instance the risk premium of the debt of Sao Paulo, which remains under 
the sovereign risk for a few years after every sovereign gets restructuring (e.g., 1898 and 1914). 
In fact, between 1918 and 1927 a large number of state bonds in Table 4 had risk premia lower 
than sovereign risk. 
Second, the redistribution of resources among states or by the central government was 
minimal. For example, in 1914 the central government divided total expenditures among its 
seven ministries as follows: Justice (7%), Foreign Relations (1%), Navy (8%), War (11%), the 
Treasury (38%), Transportation and Public Works (32%), and Agriculture, Industry and 
Commerce (3%).25 We can infer that most of the ministries, except the latter two, spend most of 
their funds in Rio de Janeiro or in providing national public goods that benefited all the states 
(e.g., security). If we assume that all the budget of the last two ministries went to the states, then 
about 65% of the central government’s budget was spent mostly in Rio de Janeiro. Now, a 
significant amount of the budget of these two last ministries (that supposedly provide 
improvements for the beneficiary states) was also spent in the City of Rio de Janeiro.26 
Moreover, there were no rules to distribute fiscal resources to the states, no programs to 
redistribute from one state to another, and no fiscal transfers to the states from the center. What 
states collected, they kept for their own expenditures. In the same way, the Constitution of 1891 
gave states the mandate to spend on education, public health, and other public goods that in 
many countries are a responsibility of the central government.  
States Excluded from the Analysis 
The capital of Brazil, the Distrito Federal (DF), was located in what is now the city of Rio 
de Janeiro during the period we study. For the purposes of this paper we excluded the DF from 
our estimates because it is not properly a state like the rest of our units of analysis. It should be 
                                                      
25 Brazil,  Balancos da Receita e Despeza da Republica  (Rio de Janeiro 1914). 
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treated like a municipality, a rich municipality with significant federal expenditure devoted to 
improving infrastructure in the place. The DF also differs from the rest of the states in that its 
local production of commodities was minimal, its export tax revenue was only 1.8% of the total 
revenues, and its main source of revenue was property taxes (Brazil, 1926).27 
We also excluded from all of our regressions the data for Góias and Acre. We excluded 
Góias because it was a landlocked state and there was no data on exports. This is because all of 
the exports from Góias had to go through other states and were not reported separately as was 
the case for Minas Gerais, another landlocked state (see the methodological appendix). Acre 
was part of Bolivia until the end of the nineteenth century and was officially declared part of 
Brazil in 1903. As a territory it did not have as much autonomy as the states of the Brazilian 
federation and the statistics for Acre are not comparable in quality and detail to those we have 
for Brazilian states. Thus, we could not include Acre in our estimates. 
Findings 
The results of our OLS estimates confirm our hypotheses and are presented in Table 7. 
States with higher state public revenues per capita tended to have lower cost of capital (i.e., the 
coefficient is negative).  The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows. Specifications 2 to 7, 
in which the elasticity of state public revenues per capita to the cost of capital is between -0.19 
and -0.27 we would say that if, for instance, a state went from being in the group of poor states, 
with an average state public revenue per capita of 6.4 mil reis, to having the average state public 
revenues per capita of 9.5 mil reis, we would observe a sizable decrease in the cost of capital. 
According to the coefficient of specification 4 this jump would be associated with moving from 
having a state government issuing debt that pays 624 bps over the risk-free rate to debt that 
pays only 555 bps. Yet going from being a relatively poor state to being one of the richest is 
associated with a reduction in the cost of capital from 624 bps to around 391 bps. In order to 
understand the intuition behind this last counterfactual one has to think that if a state like 
Pernambuco, a predominantly sugar exporter, could suddenly grow coffee and be as rich as the 
                                                      
27 Brazil, Diretoria Geral de Estatística/ Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Estatistica das 
Financas do Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro, 1926).  
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state of Rio de Janeiro, a coffee exporting state, it would get higher revenues per capita and 
could issue debt almost 0.6% (60 bps) lower for its debt issues. These results hold even after 
controlling for whether the state has defaulted in the past, for the level of imports per capita, 
debt per capita, and population in the state. Most of the regressions, from specifications from 1 
to 9, control for year and state dummies and have clustered robust standard errors to account 
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. In specifications 2, 5 and 6 we do not have 
clustered standard errors, but we still get coefficients with similar significance  
One may say that Brazil had market power in coffee and, perhaps, in rubber (even if it 
was not able to exercise it). That is why in specification 5 of Table 7 we included dummies for 
coffee- and rubber-exporting states. We can see that only the dummy for rubber is significant 
and implies that having rubber as one of the most important commodities reduced the risk 
implicit in the bonds by 0.67%.  
In Table 7 we also perform other robustness checks. First, in specification 6 and 7 we run 
the regressions without outliers, i.e., states that had spreads over 1500 bps. These were usually 
states that defaulted on their debts. Interestingly we still get similar magnitudes in the 
coefficients and negative signs (as expected). In specification 8 we run the same regression 
using yield to maturity as dependent variable. The coefficient is larger and the yields or spreads 
seem to be more sensitive to whether a state government defaults on its debt payments. In 
specification 9 we run the same regression, but including all the state bonds traded in the Rio de 
Janeiro Stock Exchange as well as those bonds traded in foreign stock markets. The coefficient is 
not significant in this case, but the magnitude seems to be within the range of our previous 
estimates.  We believe that some of the domestic bond issues may be less sensitive to revenues 
per capita at the state level because of the lower liquidity in the Rio de Janeiro stock market or 
due to the fact that state governments could push some of the local debt to domestic elites in 
exchange for political favors. In those cases the indicators of capacity to pay may be less 
relevant to determine the yield. What is more interesting is why some states were able to issue 
bonds abroad and others did not even pass the minimum threshold to do it. Finally in 
specifications 10 and 11 we run similar specifications but using Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) and Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). Both methods help us to account for 
heteroskedasticity, while PCSE also corrects for contemporaneous correlation (e.g., contagion 21 
 
among states). In both cases we find a coefficient close to 0.3 that is fairly close to our regular 
OLS coefficient (0.21-0.26). 
Simulated Instruments Approach 
Since using OLS may have potential endogeneity problems and serial correlation, in this 
section we also run an instrumental variable (IV) estimation using the variation in international 
commodity prices as the main source of exogenous variation. We believe that there is potential 
endogeneity in the OLS estimates because the yield that investors assigned to each bond issue 
was based on the expectations they had about that country’s capacity to either export or to 
obtain revenues in gold or silver (when silver was valuable). The problem is that the capacity 
that countries had to export and/or collect revenue depended to a large extent on the 
infrastructure that was put in place to integrate markets or facilitate trade. Thus, a lower cost of 
capital could lead to a larger debt burden to finance infrastructure. More infrastructure 
expenditures could lead to higher revenues as economic activity increases. Higher revenues or 
exports would make investors more confident of the repayment prospects of the debt, which in 
turn would lower yields (the cost of capital) even further. It is for this reason that we believe 
perhaps and instrumental variable approach is in order to reduce the potential endogeneity 
problem, not to mention the problems we may have with serial correlation. 
In order to address this potential endogeneity problem in the case of Brazil we would 
want to find a variable that affected the cost of capital but through revenues per capita alone. 
Since a lot of the revenue came from the taxes on commodity exports, we would want to find an 
exogenous factor that determined the export capacity of every state (without affecting bond 
yields directly). Ideally we would want to explain the variation in state revenues per capita 
across states by using factors that exogenously determine the states capacity to export 
commodities, such as geographical or climate-related variables, as well as some variables that 
could account for the variation over time in the demand for state commodities. This is quite a 
daunting task since taking fixed factors that explain what commodities were produced (e.g., soil 
types or altitudes) is not going to help us explain the variation over time.  Moreover, since 
exports followed cycles determined either by international demand or by internal changes in 
weather conditions we need to find a variable that summarizes both the conditions that 22 
 
determined the crop or commodity mix by state and the variation in the volume and mix over 
time. Therefore, we look for an alternative way to create an instrument.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows the correlations between our geographical and climatic 
variables with the export share of each commodity (to total exports). We can see that there are 
some high correlations between some of these geographical (exogenous) variables and the kind 
of commodities states specialized in. We then assume that the export shares or commodity mix 
reflect this heterogeneity across states.  
In order to capture the variation over time in the volume of exports and possible 
variations in the commodity mix we use the export shares by states at the beginning of our 
period as weights for a series of simulated export price indices by state.  We want to take the 
commodity mix by state at the beginning of our period because it could be indirectly driven by 
the cost of capital (e.g., through the infrastructure investments that states with low cost of 
capital made). We are confident that the shares of exports that we use as the initial point are 
exogenous to the cost of capital faced by states in international markets after 1901. This is 
because the first year with available data for commodity exports at state level is 1901. Most of 
the state foreign bonds were issued after 1901. Moreover, there is no evidence of compositional 
changes in the state exports during the 1890s, so 1901 should be representative of the state of 
commodity exports in 1890.  
Once we have the commodity mix we use the growth in international commodity prices 
to simulate the price received by the exporters at state level.  We use the international price for 
the main commodities produced by Brazilian states as reported in Global Financial Data. We 
lose accuracy by taking generic or average prices for some commodities that had different 
varieties. Yet the prices of, for instance, the different varieties of coffee and rubber move in 
tandem. That is why we feel our simulated price indices reflect variation over time in export 
prices for Brazil accurately. 
The strategy to simulate a price index of commodity exports for each of the states is as 
follows. Brazil has I commodities, i=1,…,8, there are J states,  j=1,…., 18, and we have T periods 
t=0,…., 1; where t=0 represents 1901. SHij0 is the export share of commodity i at the beginning of 
the period (t=0) for state i. We have the international prices for each commodity pit at dollars. 23 
 
We transform it, using the exchange rate mil reis/dollar, into mil reis28. Then we calculate the 
growth rate (g) of international prices for each commodity, which is defined as git= [(pit -pit-1)/ (pit-
1)- 1], where i and t are defined as usual. Then we use giNt to predict prices at state level using 
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is the index price for state j at period t. For each of the indices, 1901 is the base year 
(1901= 100). Once we have a price index   jt P
∧
 for each state, we use it as a simulated instrument 
for state public revenue per capita in the first stage. The idea is that our price indices per state 
will reflect how much states can extract in ad valorem taxes on exports. In the second stage, we 
use our estimated state public revenues per capita as independent variable to estimate the cost 
of capital or spread of the states that traded bonds in international markets. 
Our simulated export price indices assume that states did not influence the growth rate 
of prices in international markets. This was not necessarily the case since São Paulo, Minas 
Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro were price setters in the international coffee market for a few years 
(especially 1906 to 1914 and the late 1920s). The same may be argued for Amazonas and Pará 
which enjoyed a monopoly position in the international rubber market until the surge of 
competition from Asian countries before the First World War.  In order to deal with this 
potential endogeneity in prices, we construct alternative price indexes ignoring the price 
fluctuations for coffee and rubber. Alternatively, in some specifications we added a dummy to 
control for rubber and coffee states (in separate specifications). This is to control for the fact that 
Brazil had market power in these two commodities, even if it coffee producers were the only 
ones to exercise it actively. 
Findings Using the Simulated Export Price Indices as Instruments 
                                                      
28 Taken from A.Musacchio,‘Data Appendix for Experiments in Financial Democracy: Corporate 
Governance and Financial Development in Brazil, 1882-1950´ (Cambridge and New York, 2008) 
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The results of the simulated instruments estimation are presented in Table 8. While 
panel A of this table shows the second stage of the regression, panel B shows the first stage. The 
results confirm our hypotheses because state public revenue responds consistently to changes in 
the international prices. The intuition of Panel B, the first stage, is that higher prices in the 
commodities exported by state implied higher total exports and higher state revenues.29  
Because the estimations take the logarithm of the variables, the coefficients should be 
interpreted as elasticities. For instance, specification 2 shows that a 100% increase in the state 
price index would imply that states would get 65% more in public revenues (per capita).  This is 
not a farfetched counterfactual since, on average, commodity prices increased almost 130% from 
1890 to 1899 and about 43% from 1890 to 1909 (in mil reis). The sign and significance of the 
coefficients in Panel B is consistent with our specification (positive and significant) and fluctuate 
between 0.40 and 0.85. 
Panel A of Table 8 shows the effects of the instrumented state public revenue per capita 
on the cost of capital that Brazilian states faced between 1900 and 1928 in the second stage 
regression. The results confirm our OLS estimations as the coefficient for state public revenue 
per capita is significant and negative in all the specifications. Specifications 1 to 5 show the 
results for the whole sample with different controls. The elasticity varies from -0.60 and -0.95, 
indicating that a 10% change in state public revenue per capita could reduce the cost of capital 
by between 25 and 50 basis points, on average (i.e., because of the multiplication of the 
coefficients 0.5 and 0.95 times 10, times the average cost of capital which is 510 bps). Our results, 
however, have one important difference with the OLS estimates. We find larger coefficients in 
the IV regression than in the OLS estimate. This could be confusing if we think that the bias we 
are trying to correct for is endogeneity (i.e., endogeneity in the OLS estimates would imply a 
b i a s  u p w a r d s  f o r  o u r  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t ) .   I n  t h a t  c a s e  w e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  f i n d  l o w e r  
coefficients in the IV regression than in the OLS estimates.  Therefore, we think our IV 
regressions uncover an important finding. More than looking at revenues per se, it seems like 
investors cared more about how movements in commodity prices would affect capacity to pay 
                                                      
29 Note that in this setup increases in exports increase capacity to pay not only through higher export tax 
revenues, but also because higher exports could make the private sector expand other activities that also 
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and, thus, calculated their default risk of state bonds (the yield minus the yield of British 
consols) accordingly. 
Moreover, investors seem to have been more worried about commodity prices in states 
other than coffee and rubber states.  Specifications 8 and 9 of Panel A (Table 8) shows how we 
get larger elesticities when we run the same regressions excluding the fluctuations in the price 
of coffee and rubber, products in which São Paulo, Amazonas and Pará arguably had significant 
market power. That is, we assume that rubber and coffee were not exported at all and we 
reweight the price indices using the other commodities states exported (for lack of data the state 
of Minas Gerais gets dropped from that specification). We find coefficients of -0.97 when we 
exclude coffee and -0.95 when we exclude rubber. This implies that investors cared more about 
commodity price fluctuations for states that were less developed and less diversified than São 
Paulo and Amazonas. The former was the most diversified and industrialized state in Brazil, 
thus it makes sense to think that investors cared less about coffee prices when they made their 
estimates of the yields. In the case of Amazonas the logic is harder to explain, but it probably 
has to do with the fact that Amazonas was the state that spent more on public goods per capita, 
e.g., education, during the period we study. That is, it was probably perceived as too rich to be 
affected by year-on-year price fluctuations. Even if this last explanation is not the right one, the 
econometric results show that investors were less influenced by price movements when valuing 
the bonds of those states. 
In Specifications 6 through 7 of the same table we run further robustness checks. First 
we use yield to maturity as the dependent variable and the coefficient is -0.71, very close to our 
estimates with the coupon yields. We also include the sample of yields that are lower than 1500 
bps, to eliminate states that defaulted, we get similar results (the coefficient is -0.65, but only 
significant at 10%). This last result may be explained because since in most specifications we 
control for whether the state has defaulted in the past, we have weeded out the variation that 
comes from a bad reputation as a debtor. 
Conclusions 
The results of our study show that the cost of capital for Brazilian states and the 
probability of issuing state debt in international capital markets were highly correlated with 26 
 
state revenues per capita. Our argument is that revenues per capita are highly correlated with 
exports per capita by state and that the level of exports per capita actually depended on the 
kind of commodities each state was able to export between 1890 and 1930. We argue that the 
relationship among endowments and the cost of capital for states or the capacity to issue debt 
may have led to marked differences in access to capital and in the capacity that states had to 
spend on public goods. Since differences in expenditures on public goods can lead to market 
differences in economic development among states we believe that the setup of the 1891 
Constitution promoted some of the regional inequality that we still observe today in Brazil. That 
is, the commodity lottery mattered in Brazil because the trade boom allowed state governments 
to increase current expenditures in large projects by issuing debt.  
In our view, then, this paper shows that endowments matter beyond just colonial 
institutions, because trade shocks that took place centuries later facilitated the job of state 
governments to spend on public goods. Most of the debt was actually used to pay for 
infrastructure projects, so we believe the trade shock had a positive long-lasting effect on 
productivity for the Brazilian states that reaped the benefits of the commodity boom. Yet, more 
research is needed to prove the actual effects of the trade shock over productivity and income 
per capita in the long run.  
The episode we study matters for Brazilian history because after 1930 the government of 
Getulio Vargas changed the federalist pact, named some of his allies as supervisors of the 
actions of state governments. Moreover, after 1928 Brazilian states defaulted en masse and the 
federal government had to assume all state debts. That was the end of state debt issues in 
international markets. By 1934 a new constitution was drafted and in 1937 Vargas himself 
rewrote the constitution to give the central government more powers, including a new fiscal 
setup that destroyed the federalist pact of 1891-1930. 
Finally, if we extrapolate some of the implications of our findings to the literature that 
studies the cost of capital for countries, our paper suggests that we should look at why some 
countries had more capacity to pay than others and that, at least for the nineteenth century, the 
answer may lay the capacity that some countries had to export commodities that were in high 
demand and that had significant price increases during the commodity boom of the late 




Appendix A. Cox Hazard and Probit Estimates to Deal With Biases in Our Data 
 
In this appendix we present two approaches to examine the propensity or probability of 
Brazilian states to issue bonds in any given year between 1890 and 1930. Since the sample used 
for the paper contains only the states that actually issued bonds abroad we want to check if the 
bias in the sample selection poses problems for the relationship we are trying to draw between 
state revenue per capita and the cost of capital. Below we develop two estimates to examine the 
relationship between capacity to pay, using state revenue per capita, and the probability of 
issuing debt in foreign markets including data for all of the states in the Brazilian federation. 
Methodology 
Our first approach to study how much state public revenue per capita affects the 
probability of issuing debt is very simple. We run a Probit estimate to examine whether richer 
states had higher probability to be actively engaged in the international bond market. The basic 
specification for this estimation is: 
Pr(yit=1)= βsit + δXit + φt; 
where yit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the state i issues a bond in period t 
and zero otherwise. The independent variable is state public revenue per capita (sit) lagged one 
period.  We use the one period lag of the state public revenue because the expectations of the 
value of the bond and its yield are formed with the information available at the time of buying 
the debt instrument in the secondary market. The vector of control variables X includes imports 
(also lagged one period), population, and debt burden. In some specifications we control for the 
years in which Brazil was on the gold standard.  Imports and population are used to control as a 
proxy for the demand of public goods, which is supposed to be the final use of the capital 
derived from the bond issues. On the other hand, the state budget deficit is measured as the 
percentage of the difference between the state public expenditure and state public revenue 
divided by the state public revenue. This ratio could be interpreted as a proxy of risk as it may 
be interpreted as how responsible is each state in the administration of their finances, but at the 
same time it could just reflect the fact that some states were able to sustain deficits precisely 
because they issued debt. Thus we do not make too much out of the interpretation of this 29 
 
coefficient. Finally we add time dummy variables (φt) to control for time fixed effects common 
for all the states.  
Now, since the states that issued debt may be biasing the results of the probit (given 
how skewed is the data with some states issuing debt many times and some issuing nothing), 
we also run a Cox proportional hazard model to look at whether the relationship between state 
revenue per capita and the probability of issuing debt is still intact once the sample is less 
biased in favor of debt issuing states. The Cox hazard model has the advantage of only taking 
into account the effect of issuing states up until the point where they issue debt for the first 
time, leaving them out of the estimation afterwards. We define the dependent variable as the 
time in years until the state issues a bond in international markets and examine the change in 
relative risk of issuing the first bond by state i, in any given year t, if the state had an additional 

















where ho(t) is the baseline hazard function, which is common for all states, it has no particular 
specification, and provides the shape of the hazard function. hi(t) is the hazard function specific 
to the state i. We are interested in the relative risk of state i issuing a foreign bond in any year 
relative to the baseline risk (common to all the states) of issuing a bond in foreign markets in 
any given year. Since the Cox model is exponential, we take the log of all of our variables to 
avoid negative probabilities.  In our case, we are interested in the value and sign of the 
parameter β1, which indicates the effect of an additional unit of state public revenue, lagged one 
period, on the relative risk of issuing for first time a bond relative to the baseline risk of any 
state issuing foreign bonds in any given year.  
In sum, the reason why we first run these two estimations, one with a Cox hazard model 
and another one with a Probit, is that they allow us to include all the states of Brazil in the 
sample (those which issued debt and those that did not). Also, because of the way we design 
the Cox hazard model test, we give more weight to the states that never issued debt, thus giving 
us a less biased view of the importance of state revenues per capita on the capacity to issue 
bonds in foreign markets. 30 
 
Findings 
Table A.1 shows the result for the Cox hazard model estimations. We can see that state 
public revenue per capita has a consistent, positive and significant effect over the hazard rate of 
issuing a new bond.  In the last regression we control for the size of the debt burden using the 
debt/exports ratio, which reduced considerably our sample and the coefficient still has the 
expected sign and it is significant at 10%. The coefficient in the lag of the state public revenue 
indicates that those states collecting an additional unit of revenue increases their relative risk of 
issuing their first international bond in any year by a range between 0.036 and 0.089 (3% and 
8%, respectively).  
We find similar conclusions in the Probit estimations (Table A.2).  The marginal effect of 
increasing the public revenue per capita infinitesimally increases the probability of issuing an 
international bond by a range between 0.023% and 0.035%. The significance of this coefficient is 
consistent at 5% significant level and the size does not change after we include a variety of 
controls. Unlike the Cox estimations, we find that the size of the population also increases the 
probability of issuing a bond. It also seems that having a high cost of capital in the past or a 
history of default is taken into account by investors and made it more difficult for defaulting 
states to issue new bonds.  In sum, our findings show that effectively those states with higher 
capacity to collect tax revenue increased considerably the likelihood of issuing bonds in 
international markets.  31 
 
Methodological Appendix.  Sources and methodology to construct the dataset 
Variable Source: 
Bond characteristics  Year of issue, state, currency, nominal value, type, coupon interest rate and liquid 
entry of capital for each state and municipal bonds comes from M. Abreu, ‘A Divida 
Publica Externa do Brasil´,  Department of Economics of the Pontíficia Universidade 
Católica(PUC), Rio de Janeiro, Working paper No. 83 (1985). For bonds issued before 
1912, information on maturity, date and place of issue, underwriter, use of the debt 
and guarantees from bonds issued before 1910 came from Brazil/Ministerio da 
Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Anuario Estatistico do Brazil  I (Rio de Janeiro, 
1917).  For bonds issued after 1912, the same data comes from V. Bouças, Financas do 
Brasil. Historia da Divida Externa Estadual e Municipal. Volume X (Rio de Janeiro, 1942), 
except for the maturity of bonds between 1919 and 1924, which comes from F. Conty, 
Le Independence Financiere des Etats federes du Brasil (Paris, 1926) (for bonds traded in 
Europe) and from R. A. Young, Handbook on American underwriting of foreign securities 
(Washington, 1930) (for securities traded in the United States). 
Bond prices  For securities quoted in London we used the last price of the year or the average 
between the highest and lowest prices in December from the Investor’s Monthly 
Manual, electronic version, Yale University. London Stock Exchange Project, 1888–
1930, complemented with Stock Exchanges, London and provincial, ten-year record of 
prices and dividends (London, 1910, 1917, 1924, 1932). (There are no prices for December 
of 1914, so we used the closest quotation available). For the securities quoted in New 
York we use The Commercial and financial chronicle, Bank and quotation section (New 
York, 1921–1927) and W.B. Dana Co., Bank and quotation record (New York, 1928- 1931). 
Most of the quotations are as of December 31. In case of some missing quotations, we 
took prices from the Section General Quotations of Bonds and Stocks, which also 
includes unlisted securities. Initial prices for these bonds used to calculate yield to 
maturity were taken from R.. Young, Handbook on American underwriting of foreign 
securities … Initial prices and annual prices for bonds quoted in Paris and Brussels 
come from the Moniteur de les interest materiels, (Brussels, 1890–1920) (from “Titres a 
Revenu Fixe. Fonds Publics, Emprunts et Obligations” and “Ours General des Fonds 
Publics, Obligations et Actions”). The data reported is, in general, as of the last day of 
the year (December 31st). However, for the data extracted from “Ours…” there are 
slight variations in the dates along the first days of January (not later than the first 
week though). We also use the Compagne Des Agents de Change Pres la Bourse de 
Paris/ Chambre Syndicale, Annuaire Des Valeurs Admises a la Cote Officiell, (Paris, 1922-
23) (for this publication we use the average of the lowest and highest price). We take 
the prices of the bonds quoted in Rio de Janeiro from Câmara Sindical de Corretores 
de Fundos Públicos da Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro. Relatorio da Câmara Sindical 
de Corretores de Fundos Públicos da Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, 
1890–1947). 
State Public Revenue 
For data before 1897, we use Brazil, Ministerio da Agricultura, Finanças da União e dos 
Estados 1822-1913 (Rio de Janeiro, 1917).For data from 1897 to 1939, see Brazil/ 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica. Anuario Estatistico do Brazil V (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1940). 
Population 
Brazilian Population Census 1890, 1900 and Anuario Estatístico do Brasil V, which 
contains data from 1900  to 1939. Data from 1873 to 1899 were estimated through 
interpolation: We assumed a linear trend between censuses points for each state. 
Deflators 
Price indices are from L. A. Catão, ‘A new wholesale price index for Brazil during the 
period 1870-1913´, Revista Brasileira de Economia 46 (1992) and after 1913we use the 
GDP deflator from C. Contador and C. Haddad, ‘Produto real, moeda e preços: A 
experiência brasileira no período 19861-1970´, Revista Brasileira de Estatística, 36(1975): 
pp. 407-440 
Commodity prices   Global Financial Data  32 
 
Exports and Imports 
Data from 1902 (imports) and 1901 and 1902 (exports) from Brazil/Ministério da 
Fazenda. Importacão e Exportacão da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil Rio de Janeiro 
(1904); 1908-1912 comes from Anuario Estatistico do Brazil I; Data from 1913-1927 and 
1935-40 comes from Brazil/Ministério da Fazenda, Commercio Exterior do Brasil (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1901-1930). Information from 1928-1934 is from Brazil/ Directoria de 
Estatistica Economica e Financeira, Quadros Estatísticos Rio de Janeiro (1935-1938); 
General trade data for 1887, 1892 to 1897 and 1903-1907 is from Brazil/ Diretoria Geral 
de Estadística, Boletin commemorativo da Exposição nacional de 1908 (Rio de Janeiro, 
1908). Except for Minas Gerais1 for which we had to built our own estimates and the 
Federal District (Distrito Federal).2  Data for exports from Minas Gerais comes from 
Minas Gerais/ Servico de Estatistica Geral, Carteira Estatistica de Minas Gerais, Belo 
Horizonte (1927).  
Stock of debt by state 
  
J. P. Wileman, The Brazilian Year Book (Rio de Janeiro and London, 1909) has 
unbalanced data until 1908. For 1912 we take the information from Anuario Estatistico 
do Brazil  I . For 1922, we take the information from Brazil, Diretoria Geral de 
Estatística/ Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Estatistica das Financas 
do Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro, 1926) and finally for 1930 the source is V. Bouças, Financas 
dos estados do Brasil. Volume I (Rio de Janeiro, 1932). We also have also added data 
compilated for São Paulo (Love, São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937 ); Minas 
Gerais (Minas Gerais, Carteira Estatistica de Minas Gerais) and Pernambuco (R. Levine, 
Pernambuco in the Brazilian federation, 1889-1937 (Stanford, 1978)), who constructed a 
data series for period under study. We interporlated between these data points in a 
way that allowed us to run a panel.  
World GDP per capita 
We create a weighted average of the GDP per capita of the countries in which 
Brazilian states floated debt. The weights are simply reflecting the size of each 
country’s economy. The information for the GDP per capita for France, the United 
States and the United Kingdom comes from A. Maddison and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, 
Development Centre Studies (Paris, 2003). Thus, GDP is measured in 1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars. 




1)   We have information only for states that had customs offices and a port (or a navigable river that connected it to the ocean). For 
this reason, we originally had no data for Góias (GO) and Minas Gerais (MG). Yet for Minas Gerais we have some reports of total 
exports, but not from which port they were shipped. Since we know that most of the exports were shipped from Rio de Janeiro (RJ),  
Santos (in São Paulo, SP), and in the 1920s through Espírito Santo (ES). For simplicity we assume that the exports of MG were 
exported through RJ and SP in equal proportions. Thus we subtract the exports from MG from those two other states.  For the MG 
export data for 1927-1931, we assume that the MG average export share between 1923 and 1927 will prevail for the rest of the 
studied period and we proceed with the same methodology as explained above. In order to show that results of the estimations do 
not change, we also use the exports as reported by the federal publications (excluding MG). Unfortunately, data for imports for MG 
are not available. Therefore, all the estimations that include imports as a control exclude the observations from MG. 
2)  The city of Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazil, known as Federal District (Distrito Federal or DF). Rio de Janeiro City is in the 
middle of what was Rio de Janeiro State, now Guanabara. Both the city and the state collected their own tax revenue, yet export 
taxes collected in the port of Rio de Janeiro accrued mostly to the State of Rio, while import taxes accrued to the Federal 
Government, as in other parts of the country. Moreover, the port of Rio de Janeiro, in the Federal District, served the states of Rio de 
Janeiro and Minas Gerais. Rio de Janeiro state had no other port until the 1920s (i.e. Angra dos Reis). Therefore, we cannot 
distinguish the exports made from the capital itself and Rio de Janeiro State (or Minas Gerais, see note above). We are confident, 
however, that most of the exports shipped from the Rio de Janeiro port were commodities produced in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
and not in the Federal District. Furthermore, we consider that the state of Rio de Janeiro benefited from the exports and economic 
activity of the port of the city of Rio de Janeiro and vice versa and for this reason we use the same level of international trade 
activity for both state and city. 
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São Paulo SP Coffee 22 21.5 80.9 65,241,076             58,694,000         41.5% 163.1                     1888
Federal District DF Coffee 10 37.9 24,205,082             21,828,000         15.4% 248.1                     1889
Minas Gerais MG Coffee 10 6.2 47.3 16,284,143             13,880,000         9.8% 35.5                       1896
Rio Grande do Sul RS Cattle 4 12.1 24.9 11,532,235             10,491,000         7.4% 61.0                       1919
Rio de Janeiro RJ Coffee 4 9.7 89.4 8,052,371               7,515,000           5.3% 64.8                       1912
Bahia BA Tobacco 7 5.4 26.6 6,076,129               5,258,000           3.7% 23.4                       1888
Amazonas AM Rubber 4 36.3 237.5 5,742,976               4,772,000           3.4% 210.5                     1902
Paraná PR Mate 5 11.1 43.7 5,210,477               4,744,000           3.4% 84.5                       1905
Pernambuco PE Sugar 4 6.8 18.1 3,832,178               3,289,000           2.3% 21.5                       1905
Espírito Santo ES Coffee 6 15.5 85.1 3,337,825               2,879,000           2.0% 80.9                       1894
Pará PA Rubber 4 18.1 109.8 3,292,453               2,720,000           1.9% 39.4                       1901
Santa Catarina SC Mate 3 5.7 11.9 2,405,556               2,157,000           1.5% 36.5                       1909
Maranhão MA Cotton 4 4.1 14.1 1,579,254               1,326,000           0.9% 23.1                       1910
Ceará CE Cattle 2 3.4 11.0 1,040,881               882,000              0.6% 10.5                       1910
Alagoas AL Sugar 2 3.4 7.8 871,250                  697,000              0.5% 10.6                       1906
Rio Grande do Norte RN Cotton 1 4.7 5.7 343,373                  285,000              0.2% 7.0                         1910
Total 92 9.5 45.9 159,047,256        141,417,000    100.0% 67.0                     
Source: Own elaboration with information from Paiva (1985), AEB 1, vol.II and Boucas (1942)
Amounts received per capita represent the ratio of the total amount actually received to state population in 1931.35 
 
 
BA SE AL PE Paraiba RN CE PI MA PA AM RJ SP MG PRc SC Rse MG MT GO
Sand 35
Wood 20 25 10 3 4 10
Hides 14 12 15 15 12 17 10 12
Skins 14 12 10 10 8 7 10 10 12
Cocoa 12 65
Rubber 9 10 6 81 2 3 22 20a  20 d
Tobacco 8 86 8
Coffee 7 8 8 8.5 9b 8 48 8 6
Coconuts 5
Gold 2 20
S u g a r 1762584 1 2 2 . 5 5 6
Cotton 8 9 10 8 8 6 12 8 06
Wine and liquor 10 9 6 8 7 7
Salt 10
Fruits 10
Wax 6 8 12
Mate 00
Meat 6
Other/non specified 10 4 6 7 12 10 0.5 5
Soruce: Lyra (1914).
Note: This table shows only ad valorem taxes and not lump some taxes that were charged on some products.
The main commodities exported by each state appear in bold.
a. Rubber from the remote Javary River basin paid only 10%
b. Love (1980)
c. There is also an additional tax of 10% on all products except mate.
d. Rubber from Mato Grosso (MT) exported through Pará and Amazonas paid only 12%.
e. Tax rates not reported
Table 2. Ad Valorem Tax Rates on Commodity Exports by State (percentage points), circa 1912 
 
 
Panel A: Correlations Between Soil Type and Crop Specialization (i.e., Export Shares)
Mate Tobacco Cacao Rubber Cotton Sugar Coffee Mineral Cattle
Argissolos -0.10* -0.03 0.06 0.89* -0.28* -0.22* -0.16* -0.12* -0.20*
Cambissolos 0.70* 0.48* 0.43* -0.27* -0.37* -0.27* 0.17* -0.01 -0.12*
Chernossolos -0.12* 0.79* 0.75* -0.13* -0.20* -0.14* -0.14* 0.10* 0.31*
Latossolos -0.01 0.16* 0.22* 0.68* -0.33* -0.27* -0.12* -0.10* -0.12*
Luvissolos -0.23* -0.03 -0.02 -0.10* 0.51* 0.07 -0.27* -0.13* 0.16*
Neossolos 0.09* 0.22* 0.24* 0.20* -0.17* -0.23* -0.34* -0.13* 0.30*
Nitossolos 0.74* -0.08 -0.09 0.02 -0.26* -0.20* -0.21* -0.13* -0.11*
Vertissolos -0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.12* -0.15* -0.10* -0.13* -0.04 0.60*
Plintossolos -0.02 -0.14* -0.11* 0.52* -0.19* -0.21* -0.24* -0.11* -0.06
Planossolos -0.11* 0.78* 0.75* -0.15* -0.16* -0.07 -0.19* 0.07 0.29*
Mate Tobacco Cacao Rubber Cotton Sugar Coffee Mineral Cattle
Altitude 0.65* 0.22* 0.16* -0.43* -0.13* -0.16* 0.21* -0.07 -0.13*
Rain 0.26* -0.15* -0.12* 0.68* -0.50* -0.29* -0.02 -0.07 -0.21*
Sun -0.43* 0.21* 0.20* -0.35* 0.43* 0.50* -0.24* -0.10* 0.30*
Temperature -0.53* 0.08 0.18* 0.43* 0.18* 0.31* -0.22* -0.12* -0.07*
Distance to equator 0.52* 0.06 -0.04 -0.44* -0.42* -0.20* 0.47* 0.22* 0.06
Panel C: Correlations Between Geography, Weather,  and State Public Revenue Per Capita
Altitude Rain Sun
Public rev. pc -0.18* 0.60* -0.40*
0.28* 0.42* -0.31*
Panel B: Correlations Between Geographical and Weather Variables and the Share of Exports of Each 
Commodity, by State 
Table 3. Correlation between Crop Specialization, Geography, Weather, Soil Types, and Revenues in 
Brazilian States (averages 1890--1930)
Note: Soil type represent the percentage of the state area that corresponds to each type of soil.  Sun is the days 
of sunlight in a year. Rain is the average precipitation in a year and temperature is the average temperature in 
the state. All of these variables come from measures made from 1950 to 2000. Correlations marked with * 
indicates significant at 1%
Public rev. pc  (w/o rubber states)
0.14*
-0.22*
Temperature Distance to Equator
0.03
0.54*














































































1895 3.47% 3.02% 4.44% 3.61% 2.4% 5.9% 2.73% 2.57%
1896 3.9% 3.8% 5.4% 3.11% 2.73% 4.1%
1897 3.81% 3.14% 6.36% 4.66% 6.45% 4.72% 3.7% 6.0% 3.00% 2.66%
1898 4.21% 3.35% 6.4% 6.61% 4.77% 4.0% 6.3% 4.11% 3.29% 4.0%
1899 5.45% 4.03% 6.2% 5.40% 4.03% 4.9% 4.4% 4.03% 3.10%
1900 3.03% 7.2% 5.1% 3.19% 2.63%
1901 3.72% 3.01% 2.40% 8.16% 5.49% 5.10% 3.79% 6.9% 2.96% 2.54%
1902 2.77% 2.50% 2.08% 4.91% 3.67% 3.64% 2.98% 4.05% 3.51% 7.2% 2.41% 2.28%
1903 2.26% 2.19% 1.96% 3.77% 3.01% 2.84% 2.51% 3.68% 3.22% 5.8% 2.37% 2.26%
1904 2.15% 2.13% 1.96% 2.85% 2.50% 2.31% 2.21% 5.2% 2.90% 2.67% 4.8% 2.29% 2.19%
1905 2.13% 2.07% 2.13% 2.69% 2.36% 2.15% 2.08% 2.47% 2.33% 2.74% 2.48% 3.7% 2.02% 2.04% 6.4%
1906 3.05% 2.76% 2.99% 2.72% 2.49% 2.35% 2.06% 2.40% 2.22% 2.01% 2.02% 2.59% 2.42% 3.12% 2.73% 3.9% 2.39% 2.23%
1907 4.56% 3.82% 4.08% 3.48% 2.43% 2.31% 2.23% 2.22% 2.12% 1.66% 1.85% 3.23% 2.83% 3.97% 3.27% 3.8% 2.84% 2.43%
1908 4.01% 3.41% 4.85% 4.01% 2.13% 2.10% 2.12% 2.20% 2.09% 2.02% 2.02% 3.23% 2.81% 3.50% 2.94% 3.5% 2.78% 2.54%
1909 2.89% 2.61% 3.19% 2.83% 2.07% 2.05% 1.97% 1.70% 1.85% 1.78% 1.88% 3.22% 2.81% 2.45% 2.28% 3.0% 2.27% 2.22%
1910 2.57% 2.34% 2.85% 2.55% 1.79% 1.82% 1.67% 1.79% 1.82% 1.63% 1.67% 2.28% 2.14% 2.22% 2.08% 2.4% 3.0% 2.10% 2.07%
1911 2.58% 2.31% 2.69% 2.40% 1.73% 1.74% 2.30% 2.10% 1.52% 1.60% 1.69% 1.74% 1.66% 2.26% 2.11% 2.23% 2.05% 2.3% 3.7% 2.21% 2.12%
1912 2.75% 2.40% 3.02% 2.59% 1.67% 1.67% 2.58% 2.25% 1.51% 1.61% 1.64% 1.77% 1.65% 2.40% 2.18% 2.21% 2.00% 2.12% 1.99% 3.6% 1.91% 1.89%
1913 2.62% 2.25% 5.89% 4.50% 1.75% 1.69% 2.59% 2.20% 1.54% 1.91% 1.67% 2.19% 1.89% 2.13% 1.92% 2.88% 2.35% 2.35% 2.11% 3.4% 1.89% 1.80%
1914 4.34% 3.42% 7.28% 5.47% 4.53% 3.65% 3.51% 2.81% 1.78% 3.31% 2.28% 3.30% 2.70% 4.13% 3.22% 2.91% 2.43% 5.11% 4.09% 3.15% 2.15%
1915 4.21% 3.30% 6.88% 4.95% 2.17% 5.0% 4.99% 3.84% 6.80% 4.95% 6.36% 4.95% 3.34% 2.49% 2.8%
1916 3.77% 2.68% 7.44% 4.52% 6.17% 4.03% 1.84% 4.2% 6.08% 4.13% 9.65% 6.08% 4.08% 3.06% 2.9% 2.40% 1.53%
1917 4.22% 2.84% 6.41% 3.34% 6.98% 4.36% 1.51% 3.9% 6.36% 4.16% 5.08% 3.28% 2.84% 2.10% 1.89% 1.08%
1918 3.49% 2.40% 6.48% 3.46% 7.27% 4.53% 1.45% 2.9% 4.36% 2.88% 5.62% 3.62% 2.72% 2.04% 1.13% 0.93%
1919 2.90% 2.05% 6.60% 3.64% 6.10% 3.83% 1.19% 1.5% 3.03% 2.09% 5.83% 3.78% 0.95% 0.82% 3.58% 2.66% 1.62% 1.09%
1920 4.74% 3.03% 17.77% 11.53% 10.58% 5.94% 4.28% 2.58% 1.61% 1.6% 3.32% 2.09% 14.57% 8.82% 0.59% 0.45% 5.32% 3.70% 1.8% 1.31% 0.53%
1921 8.49% 5.48% 36.60% 23.58% 10.63% 6.44% 6.70% 4.14% 2.64% 2.16% 9.82% 7.31% 9.25% 5.03% 5.08% 3.39% 10.91% 7.94% 33.73% 20.27% 3.00% 2.04% 4.81% 3.49% 2.3% 2.02% 1.66% 5.52% 3.47% -0.01% 0.47%
1922 22.50% 13.71% 33.31% 21.17% 19.01% 9.98% 3.31% 2.08% 3.94% 2.07% 3.3% 10.55% 5.41% 4.69% 2.96% 11.85% 8.48% 53.89% 31.64% 4.28% 0.77% 4.48% 3.16% 2.8% 0.66% 1.41% 4.96% 2.99% 3.44% 1.68% 2.2%
1923 19.26% 11.59% 21.11% 13.32% 18.48% 9.15% 8.27% 4.72% 5.37% 2.49% 7.46% 5.46% 6.66% 3.40% 2.94% 1.86% 2.33% 1.73% 68.60% 39.62% 0.66% 1.40% 4.62% 3.21% 4.53% 4.16% 1.55% 1.52% 3.65% 2.20% 3.25% 1.51% 2.0%
1924 7.66% 4.69% 46.22% 28.65% 17.22% 6.63% 1.47% 1.03% 4.20% 2.29% 9.59% 6.97% 4.94% 2.56% 1.77% 1.14% 6.63% 4.75% 82.78% 46.95% 0.25% 0.62% 3.97% 2.79% 4.27% 4.01% 1.49% 1.53% 5.25% 3.06% 1.51% 0.88% 2.1%
1925 5.78% 3.60% 18.22% 11.34% 12.56% 7.39% 2.04% 1.39% 3.89% 1.87% 8.20% 5.99% 3.58% 1.96% 2.87% 1.88% 4.82% 3.50% 32.74% 18.22% 5.32% 1.22% 3.37% 2.42% 3.83% 3.77% 2.30% 2.35% 3.98% 2.40% 2.10% 1.14% 2.6%
1926 4.50% 2.70% 24.21% 14.68% 10.47% 5.86% 2.11% 1.26% 3.16% 1.41% 3.8% 2.7% 24.17% 13.12% 3.77% 7.49% 2.50% 1.74% 2.91% 3.09% 2.22% 2.33% 1.91% 0.85% 2.4%
1927 6.87% 4.00% 10.54% 6.41% 4.47% 2.67% 2.41% 1.42% 2.73% 1.28% 7.59% 5.42% 4.28% 2.01% 3.24% 1.92% 1.99% 1.44% 48.42% 25.35% 5.67% 3.47% 1.64% 1.49% 2.59% 2.67% 1.79% 1.99% 1.66% 1.04% 2.43% 1.00% 2.1%
1928 7.71% 4.40% 6.68% 3.78% 2.95% 1.33% 9.29% 6.56% 5.61% 3.16% 2.98% 2.06% 3.31% 2.80% 38.92% 20.04% 7.01% 3.79% 1.67% 1.51% 2.69% 2.64% 1.88% 1.70% 3.00% 1.68% 2.46% 2.46% 1.7%
1929 12.68% 6.90% 17.64% 10.21% 9.80% 3.01% 5.1% 6.73% 5.25% 6.49% 4.87% 5.89% 4.69% 68.78% 34.31% 5.89% 3.86% 2.46% 2.09% 5.33% 4.41% 3.57% 3.06%
1930 25.87% 13.58% 21.44% 11.86% 19.35% 4.37% 5.3% 11.07% 8.03% 9.18% 6.51% 9.26% 6.83% 136.19% 66.55% 8.78% 4.49% 4.43% 3.21% 8.49% 6.47% 5.63% 4.24%
1931 49.63% 25.42% 33.36% 15.65% 6.33% 11.30% 7.75% 15.49% 10.82% 272.17% 126.49% 13.52% 8.60% 10.67% 6.78%
Source: See methodological appendix for an explanation of how we calculate the yields. Sovereign risk from Global Financial Data (using the 4.5% Gold Bonds from 1889 to 1914, the 5s bonds of 1912 for 1915, and the 5s funded debt of 1914 for the rest of the period). All yields in this table are 
Note: The figures represent the implicit risk premium of the average yield for bonds of each state relative to the UK Consols. Figures in bold are spread of state bonds quoted in the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange relative to the UK Conols.
Coupon spread for Goias in 1917 is 3.4% and for Sergipe 3.7% in 1918 for apolices quoted in Rio de Janeiro are not reported in the table
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Table 4. Spreads of State Bonds over the UK Consold Yield, 1890-1931







% issued in 
Brazil
Alagoas 9,776           90% 10%
Amazonas 102,210       62% 38%
Bahia 186,883       75% 25%
Ceará 28,607         85% 15%
Distrito Federal 575,091       54% 46%
Espírito Santo 34,573         80% 20%
Góias -              
Maranhão 13,921         82% 18%
Mato Grosso 1,137           0% 100%
Minas Gerais 141,923       58% 42%
Pará 109,887       89% 11%
Paraíba -              
Paraná 85,908         80% 20%
Pernambuco 82,454         76% 24%
Piaui 157              0% 100%
Rio de Janeiro 118,640       82% 18%
Rio Grande do Norte 6,079           79% 21%
Rio Grande do Sul 137,892       56% 44%
Santa Catarina 48,243         89% 11%
São Paulo 675,128       57% 43%
SE 4,708           0% 100%
Total state debt 2,363,217    63.6% 36.4%
Source: Brazil. Diretoria Geral de Estatística. 1926. 
Table 5. Foreign and Domestic State Debt by     




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Dummy issue bond 880 0.078 0.269 0 1.000 264 0.15 0.36 616 0.05 0.22
Coupon spread 305 0.051 0.096 0.001 1.265 142 0.04 0.04 163 0.06 0.13
Yield to maturity spread 305 0.082 0.197 0 2.722 142 0.05 0.06 163 0.11 0.26
State public revenue per capita (1000's of reis) 880 9.5 10.5 1.3 76.7 264 16.9 14.6 616 6.4 5.8
Exports per capita (1000's of reis) 787 45.9 68.6 0.0 711.0 262 90.6 93.0 525 23.6 35.5
Imports per capita (1000's of reis) 791 31.7 58.8 0.5 418.2 220 77.5 93.9 571 14.0 16.8
Population (millions) 880 1.2 1.3 0.1 7.1 264 2.0 1.8 616 0.8 0.7
Deficit ratio 880 0.06 0.24 -0.62 2.07 264 0.10 0.3 616 0.05 0.21
Debt per capita lineal interpolation (1000's reis)
a
662 32.21 43.99 0 284.68 215 62.5 60.4 447 17.7 21.5
Debt1/state public revenue   661 2.99 3.17 0 25.99 215 4.3 3.8 447 2.3 2.6
Debt1/exports 585 1.82 10.47 0 206.76 215 0.8 0.6 457 17.2 20.6
Note: Rich States are those with revenue per capita are above the median for almost all years. Among the rich states are Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Espitio Santo, Rio Grande do Sul and 
Amazonas. Poor states are Alagoas, Bahia, Ceara, Goias, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Paraiba, Parana, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte, Santa Catarina and Sergipe
a) We estimate these figures by simple linear interpolation between the data points available.
Table 6. Summary Statistics
All Rich Poor40 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)















Log (Yield to 
Maturity 
Spread) 





Log State Public Revenue pc (t-1) -0.586** -0.217** -0.266* -0.227** -0.190* -0.269*** -0.269 -0.178 -0.222 -0.313*** -0.301***
(0.21) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.09) (0.10)
Log Population (t-1) 0.968* 0.968 1.322*** 0.539 -0.591 -0.591 0.532 -1.252 1.327** 1.630**
(0.54) (1.44) (0.44) (0.61) (0.59) (1.67) (1.68) (1.69) (0.56) (0.69)
Log Debt pc capita (t-1) -0.05 -0.098 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.059 0.139 0.118 0.098
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
Debt/State Public Revenue -0.05
(0.16)
Default History 1.065*** 1.065*** 1.093*** 0.919*** 1.329*** 0.777*** 0.782***
(0.20) (0.35) (0.19) (0.21) (0.37) (0.18) (0.18)
Log  GDP international -0.68
(0.43)






Constant 7.105*** 8.056*** 8.056*** 16.829*** 7.500*** 6.265*** 6.265** 6.432*** 4.454** 7.284***
(0.49) (0.71) (1.60) (3.61) (0.79) (0.84) (2.17) (2.01) (2.03) (1.58)
Controlling for commodity prices N N N Y N N  N  N N  N  N 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y Y  Y  Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y Y  Y  Y 
Clustered Standard Errors Y N Y Y N N  Y  Y Y  Y  Y 
Observations 278 268 268 257 268 258 258 267 282 268 268
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.50 0.50 0.69 0.62 0.96
Table 7. Log Spreads (Brazil states 1891-1928). Dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread of states' yield over the yield of of UK consols in basis points. The first 9 specifications are OLS panel 
data. Specification 11 is a linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors and 12 is Feasible Generalized Least Squares in order to model the autocorrelation of errors within panels. All the 
regressions are the spreads of state bonds in foreign markets but 10, which include quotations from the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange (this increases the number of states by including Paraíba, Sergipe, 
and Góias). The hypothesis tested is that those states with higher capacity to collect revenue are perceived by international markets as safer and thus have lower spreads or lower default risk. A negative 
sign in lag state public revenue per capita would confirm our hypothesis. Clustered robust standard errors unless otherwise indicated.  Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5%, 
and * at 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Second stage regression: dependent variable is the spread of state bonds relative to the UK consols

































Log State Public Revenue pc 
(t-1)
-0.88*** -0.60* -0.95* -0.80*** -0.80* -0.65* -0.71** -0.97*** -0.95**
(0.23) (0.33) (0.55) (0.23) (0.47) (0.38) (0.31) (0.29) (0.43)
Log Population (t-1) 0.75 0.73 1.56 -0.42 0.14 0.72 0.35 0.24
(1.57) (1.33) (1.50) (2.65) (1.93) (1.70) (1.93) (1.94)
Log Debt pc capita (t-1) 0.00 0.31* -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18)
Default Dummy 0.63 0.71** 0.79* 0.50





Constant 7.50*** 7.85*** 9.16*** 7.41*** 7.12*** 7.45*** 8.06*** 8.07*** 7.88***
(0.66) (1.48) (1.77) (1.63) (2.13) (1.72) (1.64) (1.95) (1.69)
Time    dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
State  fixed  effects Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
Commodity  prices N N N N N N  N  N  N 
Observations 258 258 256 256 239 246 256 229 229
R-squared 0.614 0.663 0.648 0.656 0.569 0.672 0.653 0.605 0.604
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




































Log State Public Revenue pc 
(t-1)
0.85*** 0.65*** 0.40*** 0.85*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.87*** 0.68**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)
Log Population (t-1) -1.13 -0.72 -1.17 -1.9 -1.13 -0.5 -0.5 -1.27
(1.12) (0.65) (1.59) (1.38) (1.12) (1.26) (1.76) (2.48)
Log Debt pc capita (t-1) 0 -0.08 -0.07 0 0.09 0.14 -0.06
(0.08) (0.22) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.16)
Default Dummy -0.5 -0.23 -0.5 -0.39





Constant -1.24** -1.24** -2.19 -3.50** -2.2 -1.94 -2.19 -1.08 -3.07*
(0.54) (0.54) (1.30) (1.53) (1.77) (1.47) (1.30) (1.63) (1.69)
Observations 258 258 256 256 239 246 256 229 229
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.88
Table 8. Log Coupon Spreads (Brazil states 1891-1928) Two Stage Least Squares Estimates.  Panel A shows the first stage 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the lag (t-1) of state public revenue per capita, using  the logarithm of the our simulated 
commodity price index as instrument (lagged one year). The dependent variable in the second stage is the logarithm of the yield of state debt bonds 
relative to the UK consol yield in basis points.  The hypothesis tested is that those states with higher revenue collection haver lower cost of capital. A 
negative sign in the logarithm of the lagged state public revenue per capita confirms our hypothesis and it is interpreted as an elasticity. Clustered 
Robust Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log State Public Revenue pc (t-1) 0.731*** 0.882** 0.979** 1.180** 1.591***
(0.23) (0.44) (0.44) (0.55) (0.43)
Log Population (millions) 0.6 0.62 0.878
(0.49) (0.51) (0.54)
Log Imports per capita (t-1) 0.072 0.09 -0.249 0.036
(0.31) (0.32) (0.42) (0.35)
Gold Standard Dummy 1.173 0 -1.004
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log World GDP 4.535*** 9.679** 7.510**
(0.94) (3.88) (2.98)
World War I Dummy 6.063 -0.997 -17.692
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coffee as a % of total exports 1.734
(1.08)
Sugar as a % of total exports -3.33
(2.54)
Cotton as a % of total exports 0.799
(1.69)
Rubber as a % of total exports -0.634
(1.43)
Tobacco as a % of total exports -19.038
(12.92)






Distance to equator -1.13
(0.84)
Observations 478 426 426 425 425
Table A1. Cox Hazard Model Estimates. Dependent variable is the relative hazard ratio of issuing a 
state bond for the first time in the international capital markets between 1890 and 1931. The hypothesis 
is that high capacity to collect revenue increases the likelihood that a state will issue its firts bond 
earlier.  A positive sign in the coefficient for the logarithm of lag state public revenue per capita would 
confirm our hypothesis. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients marked with: *** 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log State Public Revenue pc (t-1) 0.0510*** 0.0791*** 0.0492*** 0.0613*** 0.0593***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Log Population (millions) 0.0734*** 0.0480*** 0.0674*** 0.0520***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Log Lag Imports per capita -0.0089 -0.0069 -0.0152 -0.0094
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gold Standard Dummy 0.0922***
(0.02)
Log World GDP 0.0079
(0.03)
World War I Dummy 0
0.00 
Coffee as a % of total exports 0.0731***
(0.02)
Sugar as a % of total exports -0.0771
(0.05)
Cotton as a % of total exports -0.0119
(0.08)
Rubber as a % of total exports 0.0447
(0.04)
Tobacco as a % of total exports 0.1204
(0.11)






Distance to equator -0.0014
(0.00)
Observations 923 550 550 492 492
Table A2. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Issuing a Bond in a Given Year for any Given 
State. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating 1 if a state issues a bond in year t, or zero 
otherwise. The hypothesis is that states with high capacity to collect revenue have higher probability 
of issuing a bond in any point of time.  A positive sign in the coefficient for the lag of state public 
revenue per capita would confirm our hypothesis.Regressions 2 to 5 include year dummies. Robust 
standard errors clustered at state level appear in parentheses. This table reports marginal effects 
only. For a definition of the controls see the Methodological Appendix.  Coefficients marked with: 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%, respectively.